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Introduction 
In a Republican presidential primary debate in 2011, United 
States Representative Michele Bachmann brought the age-old vaccine 
controversy into the national limelight when she said the vaccine that 
prevents the sexually transmitted infection (STI) Human Papilloma 
Virus (HPV) was “dangerous”—a surprisingly widespread sentiment 
about vaccines in general.1 Many states have proposed legislation to 
make the HPV vaccine a mandatory prerequisite for children entering 
school; Virginia and the District of Columbia have enacted such 
legislation.2 But for those who distrust vaccines, the HPV vaccine is 
no exception. 3  Michele Boettiger, a Texas mother of three girls, 
worried about the safety of the vaccine and the message sent 
regarding sexual freedom, especially because her Roman Catholic 
background taught her to “believe[ ] in abstinence until marriage.”4 
Others have similar safety and religious concerns with vaccinations, 
even compulsory school vaccinations. 5  Thus, many states allow 
exemptions from mandatory school vaccinations, although the laws 
vary widely. In some states, all a parent has to do is assert that 
vaccines are contrary to their religious belief to receive an exemption.6 
 
1. Denise Grady, Remark on Vaccine Could Ripple for Years, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 20, 2011, at D1 (describing public health officials’ concerns 
that Bachmann’s statements would decrease the already low numbers of 
those using the HPV vaccine). 
2. See HPV Vaccine: State Legislation and Statutes, Nat’l Conference 
of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/ 
hpv-vaccine-state-legislation-and-statutes.aspx (last updated Feb. 2013) 
[hereinafter NCSL] (providing information on states that have proposed 
and enacted mandatory HPV vaccine legislation, as well as proposed 
legislation to repeal the enacted HPV legislation). 
3. Grady, supra note 1. 
4. Id. 
5. See, e.g., Steve Leblanc, Parents Use Religion to Avoid Vaccines, USA 
Today (Oct. 10, 2007, 4:31 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/ 
health/2007-10-18-religion-vaccines_N.htm (portraying Sabrina Rahim’s 
fear that vaccination caused her son’s autism, which led her to sign a 
letter claiming that, because of her deeply held religious beliefs, she 
wanted her four-year-old son exempted from compulsory vaccinations so 
he could enter preschool—even though Rahim does not practice any 
specific faith); cf. Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why 
Are So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 353, 413, 422 (2004) (naming several religious 
groups that prohibit vaccinations for their members). 
6. Pediatrician Dr. Janet Levitan of Massachusetts counsels worried 
parents to pursue a religious exemption because “[the law] says you have 
to state that vaccination conflicts with your religious belief. It doesn’t 
say you have to actually have that religious belief. So just state it.” 
Leblanc, supra note 5. 
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In other states, no exemptions are allowed. As new vaccines are 
continuously developed, the nation’s long-standing and widespread 
distrust of vaccinations, with concerns ranging from vaccine safety to 
conscientious objection, seems to be on the rise.7  
New advances in technology have led to vaccines targeting viruses 
such as the incurable but preventable HPV, an STI that has a strong 
link to cervical, oral, and anogenital cancers as well as genital warts.8 
As public officials quickly convert these biomedical developments 
from recommended vaccines, like the HPV vaccine, into mandatory 
ones, which is where many state governments seem to be headed, new 
legal frameworks need to be created.9 But the formation of these new 
legal frameworks raises central constitutional and policy questions, 
including: (1) whether the Constitution requires states to provide 
exemptions from compulsory vaccinations; (2) if the Constitution does 
not require exemptions, whether states should provide those 
exemptions; and (3) if states do provide exemptions, what the legal 
framework should be. The United States Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed the constitutionality of mandatory versus 
 
7. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National 
Immunization Survey found that in 2008 nearly 40 percent of American 
parents refused or delayed giving their young children at least one 
vaccine shot, which was a significant increase from 22 percent in 2003. 
Liz Szabo, Refusing Kids’ Vaccine More Common Among Parents, USA 
Today (May 3, 2010, 8:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/ 
health/2010-05-04-vaccines04_ST_N.htm. Additionally, a quarter of 
American parents believe vaccines cause autism. Id. Whether vaccines 
actually cause autism is a source of controversy. Compare David 
Kirby, Evidence of Harm: Mercury in Vaccines and the Autism 
Epidemic: A Medical Controversy, at xii (2005) (discussing 
mercury and thimerosal content in vaccines and the suspected link to 
autism), with Paul A. Offit, Autism’s False Prophets: Bad 
Science, Risky Medicine, and the Search for a Cure 36–46 
(2008) (describing research debunking the theory that vaccination 
causes autism, and explaining why parents believe the “vaccine causes 
autism” narrative). 
8. Lauri E. Markowitz et al., Quadrivalent Human Papillomavirus Vaccine: 
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (ACIP), Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep., Mar. 23, 
2007, at 1, 1; see also Gardiner Harris, Panel Endorses HPV Vaccines 
for Boys of 11, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2011, at A1 (identifying other 
cancers linked to HPV).  
9. The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) 
recommends routine vaccination of three doses for girls beginning at age 
nine and catch-up vaccination for unvaccinated females aged thirteen to 
twenty-six. See Press Briefing Transcript: ACIP Recommends All 
Eleven- to Twelve-Year-Old Males Get Vaccinated Against HPV, Ctrs. 
for Disease Control and Prevention (Oct. 25, 2011, 12:45 PM), 
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2011/t1025_hpv_12yroldvaccine.html 
(describing the most recent ACIP recommendations). 
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permissive exemptions from compulsory vaccination laws.10 Because 
case law, legislation, administrative decisions, and scholarly discourse 
regarding exemptions from compulsory vaccination laws offer few 
concrete conclusions,11 this issue requires further analysis.  
This Note addresses exemptions from compulsory vaccination 
laws. Part I provides historical context to the age-old vaccine 
controversy and introduces current-day issues that add another layer 
of complexity to the vaccine narrative. Part II lays out the relevant 
legal principles that govern compulsory vaccination laws: the Supreme 
Court public health and free exercise jurisprudence as well as the 
state statutory frameworks. Part III describes the overly broad 
interpretations of the Supreme Court jurisprudence at the lower court 
level and the lower courts’ confusion in addressing the 
constitutionality of a free exercise exemption. Part IV explores four 
avenues, advocating for the one that allows for exemptions in a 
certain set of circumstances. Part V sets up a novel three-tiered legal 
framework that addresses the law-medicine, constitutional, and policy 
levels of analysis.  
Examination of these issues requires balancing the tension 
between constitutional law and public health law—and more 
specifically, individual liberty and police power. The Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) defines public health as “what we, as a society, do 
collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy.”12 This 
broad definition clearly encompasses mandatory vaccination laws.13 
Mandatory vaccination advocates often quote the common law maxim 
 
10. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (holding that 
compulsory vaccination laws fall within a state’s police powers); 
Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Schs., 739 F. Supp. 2d 273, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 
2010) (“Neither the . . . Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit has directly addressed whether a religious objector is 
constitutionally exempt from a program of mandatory vaccination.”).  
11. See infra Part II.C; see also William P. Marshall, The Case Against the 
Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 357, 400 (1990) (arguing against the constitutionally compelled 
free-exercise exemption because it “sets forth a false dichotomy between 
secular and religious belief systems and ignores the similarity of their 
functions . . . in the political and social environment”); Daniel A. 
Salmon & Andrew W. Siegel, Religious and Philosophical Exemptions 
from Vaccination Requirements and Lessons Learned from Conscientious 
Objectors from Conscription, 116 Pub. Health Rep. 289, 292 (2001) 
(arguing for the free-exercise exemption in the context of compulsory 
vaccination laws using conscientious objection from conscription as a 
model); infra Part III. 
12. Comm. for the Study of the Future of Pub. Health, The 
Future of Public Health 19 (1988). 
13. Ian Glynn & Jenifer Glynn, The Life and Death of Smallpox 
135–42 (2004).  
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salus populi suprema lex est, “the welfare of the people is the supreme 
law,” to uphold a wide scope for the state’s police power.14 But just as 
vaccinations have been prevalent for centuries, antivaccinationism is 
“as old as vaccination itself.” 15  Compulsory vaccination involves 
invasive medical technology that has potential risks. Thus, a more 
sophisticated legal framework needs to be established to accommodate 
new biomedical developments that are present in vaccination 
technology.  
I. Defining the Problem: The Vaccine Controversy 
Resistors to vaccines have often thought of vaccinations as a 
“greater risk to life and limb” than getting sick.16 Although creating a 
framework where vaccinationists and public health advocates are the 
heroes and antivaccinationists are the villains may be easier, the 
narrative of the vaccine controversy is far more complex. 17  The 
earliest anti-vaccine campaigns date back as far as the earliest 
mandatory vaccine campaigns.18 Although English physician Edward 
Jenner’s first experiments with smallpox vaccination took place in 
1796, vaccination entered into American discourse with the smallpox 
outbreaks in the United States in 1898.19 State and local governments 
responded to those outbreaks by campaigning and requiring citizens 
to submit to vaccinations, which caused antivaccination movements 
across the nation.20 
In 1901, Cleveland made national news when its health officer, 
Martin Friedrich, who led vaccination campaigns across the city, 21 
 
14. Michael Willrich, Pox 301 (2011).  
15. Id. at 262 (noting that antivaccine protests began two years before the 
first vaccination was performed in the United States). 
16. Id. at 12.  
17. Compare Gregory A. Poland & Robert M. Jacobson, The Age-Old 
Struggle Against the Antivaccinationists, 364 New Eng. J. Med. 97, 98 
(2011) (describing anti-vaccinationists as scientifically ignorant or 
radical extremists who deliberately misguide the public through false 
data and violence), with Willrich, supra note 14, at 344–45 (warning 
readers to be cautious about judging the “innumerable people” around 
the world who greet scientific innovation with “skepticism, resentment, 
or steadfast resistance,” because “[t]o dismiss so many people as merely 
ignorant and irrational is worse than intolerant”).  
18. Willrich, supra note 14, at 39. 
19. Id. at 21. 
20. Id. at 39 (noting that early compulsory vaccination efforts ran up 
against “strong, even violent, antivaccination movements”). 
21. Compulsory vaccination was the national policy in Friedrich’s native 
country of Germany. Id. at 238. 
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became “a reluctant hero of the antivaccination movement.”22 After 
witnessing individuals whom he had compelled to be vaccinated fall ill 
and die of tetanus, Friedrich stopped the vaccinations and ordered all 
patients infected with smallpox to be isolated from the overall 
population.23 Instead of using vaccinations, Friedrich disinfected homes 
in the city with formaldehyde generators for months, and by the end of 
1901 he seemed to have smallpox controlled.24 Unfortunately, the suc-
cess was temporary. 25  A homeless man from New Jersey entered 
Cleveland and swept the city with smallpox a year later; in the end, 
Friedrich cautiously tested vaccines for safety and reliability and finally 
stamped out the smallpox after two more years.26 Thus, it was not only 
“old cranks” and “radicals” who had concerns about vaccinations—as 
many vaccination proponents claimed.  
Despite public unrest with the idea of compulsory vaccinations, 
by 1942 nine states and the Territory of Alaska had enacted laws 
mandating vaccinations for diphtheria.27 From 1958 to 1965, all fifty 
states enacted new legislation requiring school children to undergo 
vaccination for smallpox and other diseases.28 But by 1971 there had 
been “no reported cases of smallpox in the United States in more than 
twenty years, [causing] the annual tally of six to eight deaths from 
complications of vaccination [to become] increasingly unacceptable.”29 
As such, the U.S. Public Health Service recommended discontinuation 
of childhood vaccination against smallpox. 30  “Within three years, 
every . . . state had repealed its smallpox vaccination mandate for 
schoolchildren.” 31  Even with the rise and fall in public trust of 
vaccines, mandatory school vaccines have been required for years and 
 
22. Id. at 239 (noting that Friedrich felt that vaccines were “unreliable at 
best, toxic at worst”); see also Martin Friedrich, How We Rid Cleveland 
of Smallpox, 1 Clev. Med. J. 77, 88 (1902) (“A man would have to 
have a heart of stone if he would not melt at the sight of the misery 
[vaccines] produce.”). 
23. Willrich, supra note 14, at 239. 
24. Friedrich, supra note 22, at 89. 
25. Willrich, supra note 14, at 239. 
26. Id. at 240. 
27. Charles L. Jackson, State Laws on Compulsory Immunization in the 
United States, 84 Pub. Health Rep. 787, 788 (1969). 
28. Id. at 789. 
29.  Willrich, supra note 14, at 339. 
30. The U.S. Public Health Service instead recommended smallpox vaccina-
tions only for those adults or children who would be traveling to 
smallpox-prone areas. C. Henry Kempe, The End of Routine Smallpox 
Vaccination in the United States, 49 Pediatrics 489, 489–92 (1972). 
31. Willrich, supra note 14, at 340. 
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are associated with successful reduction of infectious disease and 
establishment of herd immunity, which occurs when a threshold of 
vaccinated individuals is reached so that others may not need to be 
vaccinated to maintain a population of healthy individuals.32  
Compulsory school vaccination laws did not force children to get 
vaccinated; they only prevented unvaccinated children from being 
permitted to enroll in a public school.33 This form of compulsion, 
however, leaves parents with only a few options, like homeschooling 
or private school—neither of which may be desirable. Thus, these 
issues have been especially important to parents.34 The enacted and 
proposed compulsory vaccination program laws vary widely and are 
inconsistent in their application: some do not speak to exemptions at 
all and others allow medical, religious, or philosophical exemptions.35 
Some courts hold that there is no right to a religious exemption from 
mandatory school vaccinations, while others state that there is such a 
constitutional right.36 
II. Mandatory Vaccination and Free Exercise Legal 
Framework  
The current legal framework for analyzing religious exemptions 
from mandatory school vaccination laws is composed of (1) the 
Supreme Court’s case law on public health, (2) the Court’s case law 
on free exercise and religion, and (3) each state’s statutes governing 
compulsory school vaccination laws. Each of these legal components, 
including their inadequacies, is discussed below.  
A. The Supreme Court’s Public Health Jurisprudence  
When analyzing a challenge to mandatory vaccinations, most 
courts and legal scholars point to the foundational early twentieth-
 
32. See Jacob Heller, The Vaccine Narrative 11 (2008) (discussing 
and explaining herd immunity); see also Alan R. Hinman et al., 
Childhood Immunization: Laws That Work, 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 
122, 125 (2002) (describing the concept of herd immunity by discussing 
how “[m]ost vaccines provide . . . protection” through vaccinating “a 
large enough proportion of individuals” so as to “indirectly [protect 
individuals] who are not immunized”).  
33. Willrich, supra note 14, at 229. 
34. See Leblanc, supra note 5 (showing the extent to which a parent may go 
to avoid vaccination but still get his or her child into preschool). 
35. Kathleen S. Swendiman, Cong. Res. Serv., RS21414, Mandatory 
Vaccinations: Precedent and Current Laws 3 (2011). 
36. See Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Schs., 739 F. Supp. 2d 273, 283 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (listing court decisions supporting the right to a 
religious exemption from compulsory school vaccination and decisions 
holding the opposite); see also infra Part III.  
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century Supreme Court case Jacobson v. Massachusetts.37 In Jacobson, 
the Massachusetts legislature had enacted a vaccination statute to 
protect against smallpox. 38  This statute addressed an increase in 
smallpox in the city of Cambridge and required inhabitants to be 
vaccinated. 39 Reverend Henning Jacobson of the Swedish Lutheran 
Church refused to be vaccinated because his son had suffered negative 
results from vaccines in the past.40 The Supreme Court held that public 
health and public safety laws fall under the umbrella of a state’s police 
power—a major holding that serves as the foundation of public health 
jurisprudence.41 Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the Massachusetts 
statute requiring Cambridge inhabitants to be vaccinated against 
smallpox, concluding that the legislation was a valid exercise of the 
state’s police power and not an invasion of any constitutional rights.42 
The second Supreme Court case on compulsory vaccination laws, 
Zucht v. King, was decided in 1922.43 In Zucht, Texas public officials 
excluded a girl from both a public and a private school because she 
did not have the required vaccination certificate and refused to be 
vaccinated.44 The Supreme Court extended the Jacobson holding to 
allow for mandatory vaccination as a prerequisite to school attend-
ance. 45  The Court stated that municipal officials had “broad 
discretion in matters affecting the application and enforcement of a 
health law.”46 The Court distinguished Zucht’s case from Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 47 in which the Court concluded that the public officials 
administrating an ordinance had an “unequal and oppressive” intent 
when they denied 200 petitions for waivers by Chinese persons and 
 
37. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
38. Id. at 12–13. 
39. Id. at 12. 
40. Id. at 17 (both Jacobson and his son had experienced illness following 
previous vaccinations, which Jacobson argued was proof of a hereditary 
condition that would cause their systems to “rebel against the 
introduction of the vaccine”). 
41. Id. at 24–25 (“According to settled principles the police power of a State 
must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations 
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public 
health and the public safety.”). 
42. Id. at 38.  
43. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922). 
44. Id. at 175. 
45. Id. at 176 (explaining that compulsory vaccination falls under the state’s 
police power).  
46. Id. (citing Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905)).  
47. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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only denied one petition by a non-Chinese person.48 The Court differ-
entiated Zucht from Yick Wo, as Yick Wo held that the officials 
exercised arbitrary power and denied the plaintiff equal protection of 
laws,49 whereas the Zucht Court stated that there was “broad discretion 
required for the protection of the public health,” and upheld the 
compulsory vaccination ordinance.50 The Zucht Court offered a cursory 
analysis with little insight as to the limitations of the Jacobson 
decision.51 But Zucht and Jacobson are the bases for state and local 
mandatory school vaccination laws.52 But it is unclear what the impact 
on the Court’s public health jurisprudence would be if a plaintiff, like 
Jacobson, came forward with a free exercise challenge that a mandatory 
vaccine violated his or her sincerely held religious belief. Perhaps the 
outcome would be different under such circumstances. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
This Note will focus on parental claims to religious exemptions 
under the Free Exercise Clause from mandatory vaccinations for their 
children. The First Amendment begins: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”53 A number of organized religious sects object to mandatory 
vaccination: the Amish, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Christian Scientists, 
among others.54 But whether or not the religious grounds are based on 
doctrines of organized belief is irrelevant.55 Rather, courts look at the 
sincerity of the person’s belief, not the truth of that belief.56 Although 
 
48. Id. at 373–74 (finding a denial of equal treatment where the ordinance 
required laundries without waivers to be located in certain types of 
buildings). 
49. Id. 
50. 260 U.S. at 177 (“Unlike Yick Wo v. Hopkins . . . these ordinances 
confer not arbitrary power . . . .”). 
51. Id. at 176–77. 
52. See infra Parts III.B, III.C, III.D. 
53. U.S. Const. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause has been applied to 
the states through its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).  
54. Cf. Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 356, 423, 430 (describing the pockets of 
religious groups that opted out of vaccinations).  
55. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713–14 (1981) (“[R]eligious 
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to 
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”). 
56. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944) 
(concluding that “the District Court ruled properly when it withheld 
from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious 
beliefs or doctrines of respondents” because “[m]en may believe what 
they cannot prove”). 
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these themes have been consistent, free exercise jurisprudence has 
evolved with Supreme Court decisions over the years.  
1. The Definition of Religion 
The primary context in which the Supreme Court has considered 
the definition of religion has been decisions regarding the 
conscientious-objector exemption from the military draft, rather than 
in the public health context. Early on, the Court rejected students’ 
claims for religious exemption from university military training 
courses in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, stating 
that conscientious-objector status was a privilege that came “not from 
the Constitution but from the acts of Congress.”57 Subsequently, in 
United States v. Seeger, 58 the Court interpreted a section of the 
Universal Military Training and Selective Service Act exempting 
individuals “who, by reason of religious training and belief, [are] 
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.”59 The 
Act defined “religious training and belief” as “an individual’s belief in 
a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those 
arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially 
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal 
moral code.”60 
In Seeger, the Court considered three consolidated cases involving 
applicants who sought a religious exemption from the military draft 
but did not necessarily believe in a “Supreme Being.”61 The Court 
ultimately held that “the test of belief in a relation to a Supreme Being 
is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place 
in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in 
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.”62 Thus, the Court 
broadly included the applicants’ nontheistic views into the Act’s 
definition of religion.  
Welsh v. United States also involved an applicant seeking an 
exemption from the draft under the Act; however, this individual 
crossed out “religious training” on his form.63 Justice Black’s plurality 
 
57. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934) 
(“[Congress] may grant or withhold the exemption as . . . it sees fit; 
and if it be withheld, the native-born conscientious objector cannot 
successfully assert the privilege.”).  
58. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
59. 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (2006). 
60. Id. 
61. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165–69. 
62. Id. at 165–66 (internal quotation omitted). 
63. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 337 (1970) (noting that while 
“religious training” was struck from Welsh’s application because of his 
uncertainty regarding the existence of a Supreme Being, his “deep 
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opinion in Welsh concluded that Seeger was still controlling because 
the individual “strongly believed that killing in war was wrong, 
unethical, and immoral, and [his] conscience[ ] forbade [him] to take 
part in such an evil practice.”64 Black continued, 
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are 
purely ethical or moral in source and content but that 
nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain 
from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs 
certainly occupy in the life of that individual “a place parallel to 
that filled by . . . God” in traditionally religious persons.65  
In both Seeger and Welsh, there was no doubt as to the depth and 
sincerity of the individuals’ beliefs as a conscientious objector.66 Thus, 
in these cases, the Court extended a broad definition of religion that 
protected exemptions based on sincere moral convictions, regardless of 
whether they were grounded in religion or philosophy. However, 
Gillette v. United States interpreted the Act as allowing exemptions 
only for those who conscientiously object to all war and not to a 
particular war, and for this reason rejected the plaintiff’s request for 
conscientious-objector status.67  
These conscientious-objector exemption cases, although far from 
specific and instructive, provide courts and state legislatures with a 
starting point for how to approach defining a religious exemption.68 
Although conscientious-objection exemptions from the military draft 
are not identical to religious exemptions from compulsory vaccination 
laws, the approach for granting conscientious-objection status has 
valuable similarities and lessons.69  
 
conscientious scruples against taking part in wars where people were 
killed” was nevertheless certain).  
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 340. 
66. Id. at 337. 
67. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). The Gillette Court 
rejected the conscientious objector status claim because “Congress 
intended to exempt persons who oppose participating in all war . . . 
and that persons who object solely to participation in a particular war 
are not within the [exemption’s purview], even though the latter 
objection may have such roots . . . that it is ‘religious’ in character.” Id. 
at 447.  
68. See, e.g., Salmon & Siegel, supra note 11, at 289 (providing a 
foundation for the application of conscientious objection from conscrip-
tion to exemption from compulsory vaccination laws). 
69. See infra Part III.B. 
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2. The Smith Standard  
A crucial controversy in free exercise jurisprudence that is also 
applicable to religious exemption claims is the level of scrutiny to 
apply. This Note will argue that the level of scrutiny should vary with 
respect to different vaccines and will suggest a certain standard. But 
first an examination of the current legal state of scrutiny analysis in 
free exercise claims is necessary.  
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court held that strict 
scrutiny was the appropriate standard for evaluating laws burdening 
religious freedom.70 This case arose from a state’s denial of unemploy-
ment benefits to a woman who was a member of the Seventh-day 
Adventist Church and quit her job instead of working on the Saturday 
Sabbath. 71  The Court concluded that denying benefits imposed a 
substantial burden on her because it forced her to choose between her 
income and her faith.72 The issue was whether there was a compelling 
government interest that the statute’s religious eligibility provisions 
promoted, which justified substantially impinging her First Amendment 
right.73 The Court held that there was no compelling interest, and so 
denying benefits violated the plaintiff’s free exercise rights.74  
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. 
Smith,75 which some argue drastically shrank the power and scope of 
the Free Exercise Clause.76 In Smith, two individuals were fired by a 
private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote, 
a hallucinogenic drug, as part of a religious ritual for the Native 
American Church.77 Because they were fired for “misconduct,” Oregon 
denied them unemployment benefits. 78  Oregon law prohibited the 
“knowing or intentional possession” of a “controlled substance” unless 
a medical practitioner authorized and prescribed such usage, with no 
 
70. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
71. Id. at 399–400. 
72. Id.  
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 406–07. 
75. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
76. Some scholars argue that Smith was not such a shift from precedent, 
while others disagree. Compare Marci A. Hamilton, Employment 
Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, the Litigants, 
and the Doctrinal Discourse, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1671, 1674 (2011), 
with Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of 
Disrespect, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 519, 575 (1994) (stating that the 
Smith Court “chose . . . to promote an advocacy of intolerance”).  
77. 494 U.S. at 874.  
78. Id.  
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exception for religiously inspired use.79 The Court decided that the 
Free Exercise Clause allowed the state to prohibit peyote use even for 
religious purposes; thus, the Court upheld the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits.80 More generally, Smith held that the Free Exercise 
Clause cannot be used to challenge a neutral law of general 
applicability.81 Under this holding, even if a law burdens religious 
practices, so long as the law does not single out religious practices for 
punishment and is not motivated by the desire to interfere with 
individuals’ right to practice religion, it is likely constitutional.  
The Supreme Court interpreted and applied Smith in Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. 82 In Hialeah, the 
Court held that a city ordinance, which barred “[killing, slaughtering, 
or sacrificing] animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or 
not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed,” 83  was 
unconstitutional because its obvious purpose was to prohibit a 
religious practice.84 The Court reaffirmed Smith, stating that a neutral 
and generally applicable law does not have to be “justified by a 
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental 
effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”85 But if a law does 
not satisfy the Smith requirements, then enforcement of the law has 
to be “narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”86  
The City of Hialeah enacted the ordinance in response to the 
Santeria Church’s announcement that it was establishing a school, 
cultural center, and museum to bring its practices (including ritual 
sacrifice) into the open. 87  The ordinance specifically referred to 
“sacrifice” and “ritual” and made exceptions for other types of animal 
sacrifice.88 Thus, the Court concluded that the law lacked neutrality 
because its objective was to stop the practice of the Santeria 
religion.89 The Court also ruled that the law was not one of “general  
79. Id. at 874, 876. 
80. Id. at 890.  
81. Id. at 879. 
82. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). 
83. Id. at 527. 
84. Id. at 526 (noting that the ordinance was enacted in reaction to moral 
concerns by certain residents of the city against Santeria).  
85. Id. at 531 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 872). 
86. Id. at 531–32.  
87. Id. at 526. 
88. Id. at 536–37 (pointing out exemptions in the ordinance, including one 
for kosher slaughter, which acted as a “gerrymander” that targeted only 
the Santeria religion). 
89. Id. at 534–35. 
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applicability,” because even though “the city’s proffered interest” 
included preventing animal cruelty, ensuring sanitary disposal of 
animal carcasses, and avoiding the consumption of uninspected 
meat,90 the ordinance did not prohibit other animal killings besides 
religious sacrifice. 91  Since the government could achieve its goals 
without burdening the Santeria practices, the law was unconstitu-
tional.92 Therefore, after Smith and its application in Hialeah, free 
exercise rights are not violated by a neutral law of general 
applicability unless rational basis review is not satisfied; conversely, a 
law not of general applicability would be found unconstitutional if it 
did not meet strict scrutiny.  
3. The Hybrid-Rights Exception to Smith 
Relevant to the issue of religious exemptions for vaccinations, 
the Supreme Court has denied free exercise rights and allowed religious 
exemptions in certain contexts. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held 
that Amish parents had the right to an exemption from compulsory 
school laws for their fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children under the 
Free Exercise Clause.93 The Court said that the Amish objected to 
education beyond the eighth grade because what is taught in schools 
is in “marked variance” with Amish values and ways of life.94 The 
Court found that the compulsory attendance laws infringed on the 
Amish parents’ rights to control the upbringing of their children and 
that “the traditional way of life” for the Amish was not a matter of 
“personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by 
an organized group, and intimately related to daily living.”95 The 
Court concluded that the Wisconsin law “affirmatively” compelled the 
Amish parents, “under threat of criminal sanction,” to act in a way 
“at odds with . . . their religious beliefs” and destroyed their free 
exercise rights.96 Therefore, Yoder applied a strict scrutiny standard 
in this case in favor of the Amish parents.97 
The majority in Smith distinguished Smith from Yoder and other 
cases in which strict scrutiny had been the standard by saying the 
 
90. Id. at 543–45. 
91. Id. at 543. 
92. Id. at 546 (finding that the government could narrow the ordinance to 
achieve the same interests without placing a large burden on religion). 
93. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 235 (1972). 
94. Id. at 210–11.  
95. Id. at 216.  
96. Id. at 218–19.  
97. Id. at 215. 
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latter were “hybrid” cases.98 These hybrid-rights cases included claims 
in which a free exercise action was connected with other assertions of 
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech or the right of 
parents to direct the education of their children.99 The Smith majority 
deemed those types of cases as ones in which to apply the strict 
scrutiny standard.100 But cases that were not considered hybrid and 
claimed exemptions from a neutral, generally applicable law would 
not be evaluated under that high standard.101  
In the wake of Smith, courts have ruled that simply adding 
another constitutional claim to a free exercise claim does not 
necessarily implicate strict scrutiny analysis.102 The Court in Smith 
cited Prince v. Massachusetts,103 a case that contained both a free-
exercise and an equal-protection claim.104 The case also addressed the 
tension between public health law and free-exercise claims.105 The 
Prince Court upheld Massachusetts’s child labor regulations against a 
woman who allowed her children to distribute and sell magazines that 
 
98. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion in Smith examined the cases in which free-exercise 
challenges were upheld and revealed that none involved only free-
exercise claims alone. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 
121 (1943) (invalidating a flat license tax on solicitations when it was 
applied to religious disseminations because it infringed upon the free 
exercise of religion and freedom of speech and of the press); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304–07 (1940) (striking down a licensing 
system that affected religious solicitations because it violated both the 
Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment).  
99. 494 U.S. at 881–82; see, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218-19 (striking down 
application of compulsory school-attendance laws to Amish parents 
because it violated both the parents’ freedom of religion and their 
liberty to control the education of their children under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments). 
100. 494 U.S. at 882–83.  
101. Id. at 884. 
102. See, e.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999); Swanson 
v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998); 
compare Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681 
(N.D. Tex. 2000) (applying rational basis review to a challenge against 
school uniforms based on the free exercise claim and the right of parents 
to control the upbringing of their children), with Hicks v. Halifax Cnty. 
Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (applying strict 
scrutiny instead).  
103. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), cited in Smith, 494 U.S. 
at 879–80. 
104. Id. at 164. 
105. Id. at 166–67 (“The right to practice religion freely does not include 
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or 
the latter to ill health or death.”) (emphasis added).  
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preached the works of Jehovah’s Witnesses on the street.106 Prince 
stated that “Massachusetts has determined that an absolute 
prohibition, though one limited to streets and public places and to the 
incidental uses proscribed, is necessary to accomplish its legitimate 
objectives.”107 These objectives included “[a]cting to guard the general 
interest in youth’s well being . . . as parens patriae.”108 Although the 
Supreme Court had not yet clearly and definitively utilized the 
doctrine of strict scrutiny as of Prince, this language is similar to 
what the Court later called “strict scrutiny.” 109 Because there is 
currently precedent that hybrid-rights claims may potentially fail 
even in the face of strict scrutiny, the idea that the hybrid-rights 
exception would swallow the rule, as suggested by some judges and 
commentators, should not cause significant alarm. 110  Nothing in 
practice would be altered. 
 
106. Id. at 162. 
107. Id. at 170; see also id. at 173–74 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“The burden 
was . . . on . . . Massachusetts to prove the reasonableness and 
necessity of prohibiting children from engaging in [this type of religious 
activity and] . . . [i]f the right . . . to practice . . . religion in that 
manner is to be forbidden by constitutional means, there must be 
convincing proof that such a practice constitutes a grave and immediate 
danger to the state or to the health, morals or welfare of the child.”).  
108.  Id. at 166. 
109. The strict scrutiny standard was initially implied in the famous footnote 
four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938): “There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption 
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution . . . which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” However, the formal-
ized strict scrutiny analysis did not fully develop until decades after 
1942. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An 
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand. 
L. Rev. 793, 799–800 (2006) (“The Supreme Court first used the precise 
term ‘strict scrutiny’ in 1942’s Skinner v. Oklahoma . . . [but] in the 
development of constitutional doctrine in the decades after Skinner, 
Justice Douglas’s phrase caught on and eventually became increasingly 
formalized into a two ‘prong’ test now referred to as ‘strict scrutiny’ 
. . . analysis.”).  
110.  Justice Souter raised the concern that “[i]f a hybrid claim is simply one 
in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid 
exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule.” 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring). This Note and other 
commentators conclude that a higher standard for the implication of 
another constitutional right ameliorates this concern. See Steven H. 
Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the 
Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception”, 108 
Penn St. L. Rev. 573, 588 (2003) (“[T]he approach utilized by the 
Ninth Circuit requiring plaintiffs to plead a colorable companion claim 
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But the fact that the analysis in Prince seems very close to strict 
scrutiny presents another twist. Justice Scalia used Prince to support 
his holding in Smith. 111 But as has been described above and as 
Justice O’Connor pointed out in her Smith concurrence,112 the Court 
rejected claims like the one in Prince only after carefully considering 
the competing interests.113 Therefore, the standard in Prince was not 
one of rational basis review but more like strict scrutiny.114 The fact 
that the majority in Smith uses Prince as an example in support of 
rejecting exemptions from laws of neutral and general applicability is 
confusing. Thus, as has already been described and will be further 
examined, whether the strict scrutiny standard or Smith’s seemingly 
rational basis review would apply and the availability of the hybrid-
rights exception became questions that lower courts had difficulty 
applying.115  
C. The States’ Current Statutory Framework 
The third source of law that governs mandatory vaccination cases 
is each state’s statutory framework. Each state has varying statutes 
that require certain vaccines, and some provide for religious and 
philosophical exemptions.116 All states allow medical exemptions.117 
These apply, for instance, if a student has a compromised immune 
 
would seem to blunt much of the force of Justice Souter’s critique of 
Smith’s hybrid claim exception.”). 
 
111. Justice Scalia wrote: “Subsequent decisions have consistently held 
that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) 
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Emp’t Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also id. at 880 (“We found no constitutional infirmity in excluding 
[these children] from doing there what no other children may do.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
112.  Id. at 896 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
113. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
114. Id. at 170 (finding a “legitimate” government interest and the necessity 
of the prohibition); cf. Sarah L. Dunn, Note, The “Art” of Procreation: 
Why Assisted Reproduction Technology Allows for the Preservation of 
Female Prisoners’ Right to Procreate, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2561, 2567 
n.45 (2002) (stating that Prince used strict scrutiny analysis). 
115. See infra Part V.B.  
116. See Appendix. Table 1 lists the statutory requirements in each of the 
states and provides an overview of the states’ requirements for 
compulsory school vaccination laws and the exemptions that are 
allowed.  
117. See NCSL, supra note 2 (describing the exemptions that apply under 
state statutes). 
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system, an allergy to a vaccine, an illness at the time of vaccination, 
or medical contraindications to vaccines.118 Almost all states and the 
District of Columbia currently allow religious exemptions 119—only 
Mississippi and West Virginia do not.120 Philosophical exemptions are 
provided by seventeen states.121  
 
118. Id. (describing the scenarios in which the medical exemptions apply). 
119. Ala. Code § 16-30-3 (2012); Alaska Admin. Code tit. 4, § 06.055 
(2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-873 (2009); Ark. Code Ann. 
§ 6-18-702 (2007); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120365 (West 
2012); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-4-903 (2012); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 10-204a (West 2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 131 (2007); D.C. 
Code § 38-506 (LexisNexis 2007); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1003.22 (West 
2012); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-771 (2012); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 2302A-
1156 (2011); Idaho Code Ann. § 39-4802 (2011); 105 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 5/27-8.1 (West 2012); Ind. Code Ann. § 21-40-5-6 (West 2008); 
Iowa Code § 139A.8 (2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-5209 (2002); Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 214.036 (West 2006); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 17:170(E) (2001); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20A, § 6355 (2008); Md. 
Code Ann., Educ. § 7-403 (LexisNexis 2008); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
76, § 15 (West 2009); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.9215 (West 
2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 121A.15 (West 2008); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 167.181 (West 2010); Mont. Code Ann. § 20-5-405 (2011); Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 79-221 (2008); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 392.437 (West 
2011); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141-C:20-c (2005); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 26:1A09.1 (West 2007); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-5-3 (2006); N.Y. Pub. 
Health Law § 2164 (McKinney 2012); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 130A-155 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 23-07-17.1 (2012); Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.671 (West 2005); Okla. Stat. tit. 70, 
§ 1210.192 (2010); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 433.267 (West 2011); 24 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-303a (West 2006); R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-38-2 
(2001); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-29-180 (2012); S.D. Codified Laws 
§ 13-28-7.1 (2004); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-5001 (2009); Tex. Educ. 
Code Ann. § 38.001(c)(1)(B) (West 2006); Utah Code Ann. § 53A-
11-302 (West 2004); Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1122 (2012); Va. Code Ann. 
§ 32.1-46(D)(1) (2011); Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.210.090 (2012); Wis. 
Stat. Ann. § 252.04 (West 2009); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-309 (West 
2011). 
120. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-23-37 (2009) (does not provide for religious 
exemption); W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-3-4 (LexisNexis 2011) (same). 
121. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-873 (2009); Cal. Health & Safety 
Code § 120365 (West 2012); Idaho Code Ann. § 39-4802 (2011); La. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:170(E) (2001); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20A, § 6355 
(2008); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.9215 (West 2012); Minn. 
Stat. Ann. § 121A.15 (West 2008); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-221 (2011); 
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 23-07-17.1 (2012); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 3313.671 (West 2005); Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 1210.192 (2010); Tex. 
Educ. Code Ann. § 38.001(c)(1)(B) (West 2006); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 53A-11-302 (West 2004); Vt. Stat. Ann. § 1122 (2012); Wash. 
Rev. Code § 28A.210.090 (2012); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 252.04 (West 
2009). 
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III. Lower Court Decisions in Disarray:  
To Exempt or Not To Exempt  
The introduction of mandatory vaccinations turned public schools 
in the United States “into theaters of conflict.”122 Before Jacobson, 
religious antivaccinationists garnered sympathy from courts.123 After 
Jacobson and Smith, most cases in which parents have litigated to 
seek exemptions have not succeeded. This is not to say that parents 
have not received religious exemptions from compulsory school 
vaccination laws for their children. In fact, the statutes allowing 
exemptions vary, with some states requiring only a statement of 
opposition from the student, parent, or guardian.124 An assessment of 
cases involving exemptions from compulsory vaccinations shows 
differing treatments by lower courts.  
A. Avoiding the Constitutional Question: Exceeding Statutory Authority  
Some courts have avoided answering the critical question of 
whether prohibiting a parent from obtaining exemptions from 
compulsory vaccination laws is unconstitutional by instead analyzing 
the scope of statutory authority. In other words, these courts looked 
at whether an official or a department had the authority to deny an 
exemption based on the language of the relevant statute. Thus, the 
court could reach a decision on whether rejecting the exemption was 
proper based entirely on statutory interpretation.  
In In re LePage, a mother sought judicial review of the Wyoming 
Department of Health’s denial of her request for a religious exemption 
from a school immunization requirement, the hepatitis B vaccine 
(HBV), for her daughter.125 The issue was whether the Wyoming 
statute126 required that an exemption from immunization be granted if 
there was a written religious objection or allowed the Department of 
Health to inquire into the sincerity of the petitioner’s religious 
beliefs.127 The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the Department of 
Health “exceeded its statutory authority” by inquiring into the 
sincerity of the mother’s religious beliefs because the statute used 
 
122. Willrich, supra note 14, at 230.  
123. E.g., Matthews v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 86 N.W. 1036 (Mich. 1901); 
State v. Hay, 35 S.E. 459 (N.C. 1900); Morris v. Columbus, 30 S.E. 850 
(Ga. 1898); Potts v. Breen, 47 N.E. 81 (1897). 
124. Leblanc, supra note 5. 
125. In re LePage, 18 P.3d 1177, 1178–79 (Wyo. 2001). 
126. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-309 (West 2011).  
127. 18 P.3d at 1178. 
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mandatory language. Therefore, the exemption was “self-executing 
upon submission of a written objection.”128  
Similarly, in Department of Health v. Curry, the First District of 
the District Court of Appeals of Florida concluded that the state 
Department of Health exceeded its statutory authority, because the 
Florida statute129 affords greater protection for “a parent’s fundamental 
right to raise his or her child according to the religious tenets that he or 
she chooses” by “prohibiting any inquiry by the Department into the 
bona fides of the parent’s or guardian’s objection.”130 Thus, courts have 
used statutory construction and allocation of statutory authority to 
allow exemptions from compulsory school vaccination laws.131  
B. Facing the Question: The Constitutional Free Exercise Right Exists 
Courts addressing the constitutional questions have imposed a 
“present danger” standard and have impliedly supported the idea of a 
constitutional right to exemption.132 In Brown v. City School District 
of Corning,133 the trial court ruled that parents were entitled to the 
exemption specified in the New York statute, which stated that the 
mandatory vaccination law would not apply to “children whose 
[parents or guardians held] genuine and sincere religious beliefs 
[contrary to the mandate].”134 The court found that the parents pos-
sessed religious beliefs that were “actively practiced in [their] home,” 
which satisfied the court that the parents’ religious beliefs were 
sincere.135 Since the court additionally concluded that there was no 
“clear and present danger” of a particular communicable disease, the 
parents’ application for a preliminarily injunction enjoining the school 
district from preventing their child from attending school was 
granted.136 Other New York cases have followed this precedent.137 
 
128. Id. at 1180–81. 
129. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.032(3) (repealed 2003).  
130. Dep’t of Health v. Curry, 722 So. 2d 874, 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998). 
131. See Jones v. Wyo. Dep’t of Health, 18 P.3d 1189, 1193, 1195 (Wyo. 
2001) (holding that the Hepatitis B vaccination was optional and, in 
any event, the Health Department did not have statutory authority to 
require that a reason be given for a medical exemption to 
immunizations). 
132. Willrich, supra note 14, at 314.  
133. Brown v. City Sch. Dist. of Corning, 429 N.Y.S. 2d. 355 (Sup. Ct. 
1980). 
134. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164(9) (McKinney 2012). 
135. 429 N.Y.S. 2d. at 357. 
136. Id. 
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A New York Family Court in In re Christine M. distinguished 
Brown.138 The court held that a father’s refusal to vaccinate his four-
year-old daughter for measles was medical neglect because there was 
an enduring community measles epidemic.139 This conclusion followed 
because, even though the father was a Church of God Seventh Day 
member and had “sincerely held” beliefs that were the foundation of 
his religious exemption claim, his convictions had “medical and 
scientific concerns” and his Church did not forbid vaccinations. 140 
Interestingly, the court refused to mandate that the father vaccinate 
his child because, by the time the court’s decision was made, the 
measles epidemic had subsided.141 Brown and In Re Christine M. can 
be construed as implying that a constitutional right to religious 
exemption exists, even though the free exercise right is dramatically 
restricted in the face of public health interests to vaccinate. 
C. Facing the Question: The Constitutional Free Exercise Right Does 
Not Exist 
Despite the holdings of cases like Brown, in 2010, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Caviezel 
v. Great Neck Public Schools held that there was no constitutional 
right to religious exemption from mandatory vaccination laws.142 The 
parents of a four-year-old claimed that they were entitled to a 
religious exemption from the New York public health law that allowed 
exemptions for those parents or guardians who held “genuine and 
sincere religious beliefs . . . contrary to the practices herein 
required.” 143  The court came to this conclusion by applying the 
 
137. See, e.g., In re Moses v. Bayport Bluepoint Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 
05 CV 3808(DRH)(ARL), 2007 WL 526610, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 
2007) (denying a school district’s motion for summary judgment on the 
basis that a jury could find that the parents had a sincere religious 
belief against mandatory vaccinations—implicitly supporting the idea of 
a right to religious exemptions); Bowden v. Iona Grammar Sch., 726 
N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (App. Div. 2001) (upholding preliminary injunction 
enjoining school from requiring student to be vaccinated, in part 
because “the religious exemption set forth in Public Health Law 
§ 2164(9) is applicable to a private or parochial school” and because 
“plaintiffs may assert a cause of action to enforce their right to a 
religious exemption under the statute” (citing Brown, 429 N.Y.S.2d 
355)). 
138. In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 616 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992). 
139. Id. at 613. 
140. Id. at 614–18. 
141. Id. at 618. 
142. Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Sch., 739 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
143. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164(9) (McKinney 2012).  
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Supreme Court’s public health and free exercise jurisprudence and by 
citing other district court cases that concluded society’s interest in 
preventing the spread of disease trumped the right to free exercise.144  
In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held in Workman v. Mingo County Board of Education145 that 
a mother was not entitled to exemption from the West Virginia law146 
requiring her daughter to be vaccinated before entrance into school. 
The plaintiff asserted that her case qualified for the hybrid-rights 
exception because her claim was one regarding “education-related 
laws that burden religion.”147 The court stated that, even though 
there was some disagreement about what level of scrutiny should 
apply and about the applicability of the hybrid-rights exception, this 
case was not one in which the hybrid-rights question needed to be 
addressed.148  
Applying strict scrutiny, the Workman court held that West 
Virginia had a compelling interest in requiring children to be 
vaccinated before they were allowed to attend school; thus, even if 
this was a hybrid-rights case, the state would still prevail because the 
public health law satisfied strict scrutiny.149 Like in Caviezel, the 
court also came to this decision primarily by broadly applying the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Jacobson and the dicta in Prince. 150 
Other courts have similarly deferred to the Court’s dicta with little 
additional analysis in holding that the government prevails against 
parental claims for religious exemptions.151 
D. A New Law-Medicine Perspective: The Free Exercise Right Can Exist 
One court has engaged in analysis that other courts should use, 
even though the court’s conclusion is open to question. In Boone v. 
 
144. Caviezel, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 284–85 (citing Workman v. Mingo Cnty. 
Sch., 667 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); Boone v. Boozman, 
217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 953 (E.D. Ark. 2002); McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 
F. Supp. 2d 945, 949–50 (W.D. Ark. 2002). 
145. Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348 (4th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 590 (2011). 
146. W. Va. Code Ann. § 16-3-4 (LexisNexis 2012 ). 
147. Workman, 419 F. App’x at 353. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 353–54. 
150. Id. at 353. 
151. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 65 S.E.2d 848, 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951) 
(relying on Jacobson and holding that such statutes fall within 
legislative power); Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 222–23 (Miss. 1979) 
(applying Jacobson, Zucht, and Prince broadly and when mandatory 
school vaccination requirements “conflict[ed] with the religious beliefs of 
a parent,” even if the parent’s beliefs were sincere). 
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Boozman, a mother attempted to distinguish her claim—that her 
daughter was not required to be vaccinated against hepatitis B 
(HBV)—from that of Jacobson because there was no presently 
declared health emergency.152 The District Court ruled that Jacobson 
was not limited to those diseases presenting a “clear and present 
danger” of spreading disease to society.153 This court, unlike many 
others, discussed the nature, communicability, and consequences of 
the disease at issue. Although conceding that hepatitis B’s communi-
cability was different from that of smallpox because hepatitis B does 
not spread airborne as smallpox does, the court nevertheless described 
hepatitis B as a “dangerous” disease because of its consequences, 
citing the viral infection as the second leading cause of cancer.154 The 
court held that the statute, which allowed objections based only on 
recognized religions, violated the mother’s free exercise rights when 
she based her refusal on a religious “belief.”155 The court concluded 
that there was no compelling interest in preferring some religious sects 
and individuals over others, but the rest of the statute, which required 
immunization without a religious exemption, was constitutional.156 
The tipping point for the Boozman court was that, because the 
groups at highest risk for the STI hepatitis B (presumably young 
adults) would not likely “self-identify and pursue the vaccine,” 
immunizing “school children against Hepatitis B has a real and 
substantial relation to the protection of the public health and the 
public safety.”157 Thus, this court conducted an analysis that took 
into consideration the specific factors of particular vaccinations. This 
mode of analysis differs from the cases that used Jacobson and Zucht 
as blanket statements and from the decisions that quoted Supreme 
Court dicta to support that broad Jacobson and Zucht deference.  
Post-Smith, courts have had different evaluations for when to 
allow religious exemptions and what the inquiry would look like, even 
when deciding that such exclusions would be allowed. 
 
152. Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002). 
153. Id. 
154. Id.  
155. Id. at 947. 
156. Id. at 954. 
157. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013 
Giving Families Their Best Shot 
892 
IV. To Exempt: Arguing for a Limited Right to 
Religious Exemption 
With newly created vaccinations in the pipeline, including some 
that do not target communicable diseases in an epidemic context,158 
the list of mandatory vaccinations will get longer, and the issue 
of exemptions to the mandates will also grow. There are four 
possible approaches in determining the scope of religious exemptions: 
(1) overrule Jacobson and implement a new framework replacing 
Jacobson; (2) uphold and update Jacobson, requiring mandatory 
vaccinations with full religious exemption rights; (3) uphold and update 
Jacobson, requiring mandatory vaccinations and expressly declaring 
that religious exemptions should be withdrawn; or (4) uphold and 
update Jacobson, requiring vaccinations but only allowing religious 
exemptions from certain categories of compulsory vaccinations. This 
Part will reject the “overrule Jacobson” approach, the “full exemption” 
approach, and the “no exemption” approach. The conclusion is that the 
“limited exemption” approach will yield the best balance between 
individual civil liberties and the states’ police powers. 
A. Rejecting “Overrule Jacobson” and Accepting “Update Jacobson” 
In addressing the Supreme Court’s public health jurisprudence, 
there has been discussion about the applicability of Jacobson to 
today’s society.159 There is validity to the argument that the current 
public health precedent does not directly apply to vaccinations in the 
STI context. But with over a century of history and reliance on 
Jacobson and its progeny in the lower courts, it seems unlikely that 
Jacobson will be overruled and replaced by new framework. Thus, the 
following analysis focuses on why Jacobson does not precisely fit 
today’s circumstances and should be updated.  
When Jacobson was decided, Cambridge, Massachusetts, was 
undergoing a smallpox epidemic.160 The nature and communicability 
of smallpox and STIs, for example, are quite different. Smallpox was a 
highly contagious disease and spread from casual contact.161 STIs are 
not casually communicable diseases, requiring a certain situation for 
spread and infection to occur. The language that Jacobson used to 
describe the necessity for liberty to be conditional under times of 
 
158. G. Pascal Zachary, Vaccines and Their Promise Are Roaring Back, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2007, at B3. 
159. E.g., Note, Toward a Twenty-First-Century: Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
121 Harv. L. Rev. 1820 (2008). 
160. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905). 
161. Willrich, supra note 14, at 22.  
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great pressure has an underlying tone of urgency, similar to that of a 
public emergency.162  
Some medical professionals and public health advocates would 
analogize the situation at Cambridge in Jacobson to today’s 
predicament, as our nation is currently undergoing a quiet yet 
powerful epidemic with STIs such as HPV infection.163 However, the 
medical gap in danger and necessity between smallpox and STIs is 
still quite distinct. States have recognized the danger of infections 
that are not casually communicable, and legislation has incorporated 
vaccines addressing those types of infections.164 But the key question 
involves deciding what kind of factors implicate the “public necessity” 
urgency that Justice Harlan emphasized in Jacobson.165 This Note 
claims that “public necessity” does not apply to all mandatory 
vaccination requirements but rather that the medical distinctions 
between the diseases, predicated on science and logic, should be 
incorporated into the legal framework.166 
Currently, mandatory vaccination cases have been immensely 
deferential to Jacobson, applying it broadly and expanding the scope 
of governmental power—including using Jacobson to justify 
compulsory sterilization. 167  But the scope of today’s compulsory 
vaccination laws far exceeds what the Court could have imagined in 
the early 1900s. The Court’s decisions were based on diseases such as 
 
162. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27. 
163. Richard A. Watson, Human Papillomavirus: Confronting the 
Epidemic—A Urologist’s Perspective, 7 Revs. In Urology 135, 138–40 
(2005). 
164. See Karen R. Broder et al., Preventing Tetanus, Diphtheria, and 
Pertussis Among Adolescents: Use of Tetanus Toxoid, Reduced 
Diphtheria Toxoid and Acellular Pertussis Vaccines, Morbidity & 
Mortality Wkly. Rep., Mar. 24, 2006, at 1, 7 (discussing the tetanus 
vaccine, which is a required immunization for children entering school, 
as a serious bacterial infection that is not a communicable disease); see 
also Eric E. Mast et al., A Comprehensive Immunization Strategy to 
Eliminate Transmission of Hepatitis B Virus Infection in the United 
States, Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep., Dec. 8, 2006, at 1 
(describing the hepatitis B vaccine (HBV) and its targets of infection, 
which cannot be infected by casual contact). 
165. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27. 
166. See infra Part V. 
167. Justice Holmes infamously relied on Jacobson to hold that “[t]he 
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover 
cutting the Fallopian tubes . . . . Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough.” Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding a state statute 
providing for the sterilization of those committed to mental 
institutions); see Willrich, supra note 14, at 334.  
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smallpox and measles and their sweeping effects.168 At that time, 
knowledge about and technology targeting STIs were not available. 
Therefore, Jacobson, while significant and relevant, should not be 
considered a blanket rule applied to all current compulsory 
vaccination laws, as we have many mandates that were not 
implemented or even imaginable at that time.  
But as one of the few Supreme Court precedents on public health 
and compulsory vaccination laws available, Jacobson is relevant to 
mandatory vaccination decisions in the STI context. One way to 
differentiate Jacobson from current developments in vaccine 
technology is that vaccines in the STI context, such as HPV vaccines, 
fall predominantly in the category of “self-protection” laws. “Self-
protection” describes the idea that one is doing something to protect 
one’s own interest or for one’s own protection. 169  However, the 
underlying rationale of public health is “protection of society” and 
“for others,” or “protection of the public.”170 Thus, the HPV vaccine, 
for example, is distinguishable from the public health rationale and 
Jacobson’s underlying “protection of society” and “for others” 
justification, expressly referred to in Justice Harlan’s necessity 
language,171 because HPV needs intimate contact in order for the 
virus to be spread. Conversely, smallpox was spread easily through 
casual contact. 172 Thus, individuals who receive the HPV vaccine 
primarily use it to prevent the STI, and because HPV has such a 
tight association with cancers, especially cervical cancer, many view 
the HPV vaccine as also protecting themselves against cancer.173  
 
168. See id. at 28, 32 (describing the terrifying and violent symptoms, 
mortality, and the permanent existence of smallpox scars on survivors). 
169. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 Am. J.L. 
& Med. 461, 462 (1986) (providing a foundation for the idea of “self-
protection”). 
170. Id. at 483, 485. 
171. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) (“Smallpox being 
prevalent and increasing at Cambridge, the court would usurp the 
functions of another branch of government if it adjudged, as matter of 
law, that the mode adopted under the sanction of the State, to protect 
the people at large, was arbitrary and not justified by the necessities of 
the case.”).  
172. See Willrich, supra note 14, at 21 (describing the infectiousness of 
smallpox); see also id. at 239 (explaining that one homeless man swept 
Cleveland into a major smallpox outbreak). 
173. See Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs): Genital HPV Infection-Fact 
Sheet, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, http:// 
www.cdc.gov/std/hpv/stdfact-hpv.htm (last updated Aug. 9, 2012) 
(providing information on the association between HPV and cancers); 
see also Div. of STD Prevention, Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Prevention 
of Genital HPV Infection and Sequelae: Report of an 
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On the other hand, laws mandating HPV vaccine are also not 
pure “self-protection” laws because even though getting the vaccine 
means protecting oneself from infection, taking the vaccine also 
reduces the rapid spread of the STI to others. Thus, although 
Jacobson may not necessarily fit neatly within the context of 
vaccination technology innovations, Jacobson is at least relevant to 
mandatory vaccination decisions in the STI context, although perhaps 
not directly instructive. The above analysis, however, supports the 
contention that Jacobson should be updated. 
B. Rejecting the “Full Exemption” Approach 
The “full exemption” approach—that is, allowing all exemptions—
would not be feasible because such a methodology would dismantle 
the fundamental goal of mass vaccination programs. Mandatory 
vaccination laws “employ[ ] the concept of herd protection, and hold[ ] 
that only a limited, statistically determined proportion of a popula-
tion needs to possess individual immunity to a particular disease in 
order for the entire population to remain protected from the 
disease.”174 The idea is that vaccination laws apply to each person to 
protect the greater community; once a certain threshold number of 
people are vaccinated, then even if a small number of people are not 
vaccinated, the larger community is still protected.175 Thus, if all 
religious exemptions from mandatory vaccinations were allowed, then 
the basis for vaccination laws could be destroyed, and the community 
would be left unprotected. On one hand, this result would occur only if 
the number of religious exemptions were so high that it put the 
community below the threshold and herd immunity is lost.176 On the 
other hand, the immense presence of and rise in popularity of antivac-
cination sentiments makes the second approach a dangerous choice. 
C. Rejecting the “No Exemption” Approach  
and Keeping “Limited Exemption” 
In addressing the free exercise question—whether there is a 
constitutional right to religious exemptions from mandatory vaccina-
tion laws—most of the courts in compulsory vaccination cases have 
broadly applied Jacobson and the Prince dicta to mean any 
mandatory vaccination law satisfies the compelling governmental 
 
External Consultants’ Meeting 6 (1999), available at http:// 
www.cdc.gov/std/hpv/HPVSupplement99.pdf (further information on 
HPV’s relationship with cervical cancer). 
174. Heller, supra note 32, at 11. 
175. Id.  
176. Id. 
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interest test.177 Thus, especially with Smith, it may be tempting to 
conclude that no right to religious exemptions from compulsory 
vaccination exists. Under that rationale, the “no exemption” approach 
of upholding Jacobson and mandating vaccines without allowing for 
religious exemptions seems appealing, especially with lower courts 
coming to the decision that no constitutional right to exemption 
exists. 178  On the contrary, this Note argues that the cases on 
conscientious objection from the military draft provide a convincing 
argument that there should be a statutory right to religious 
exemptions from compulsory vaccination laws, even though there may 
not be a constitutional right.179 Thus, there are three compelling and 
mutually reinforcing reasons why state legislatures should, and most 
legislatures currently do, provide some form of religious exemptions 
from compulsory vaccination laws.180 
From a historical and public policy standpoint, antivaccination 
sentiments have been a strong force since vaccinations were invented 
and forced upon others. The most adamant objections to vaccinations 
came from parents who had lost their children due to complications 
that they attributed to vaccines. One poignant example was Mrs. 
Caswell of Cambridge, Massachusetts, who lost her five-year-old 
daughter Annie to lockjaw during the smallpox outbreak that gave 
rise to the law that was upheld in Jacobson.181 The death certificate 
listed tetanus as the cause of death, with vaccination as a 
contributing cause.182 Contrary to the idea that those who protest 
mandatory vaccinations are just cranks and extremists, many citizens 
who object to compulsory vaccination laws are everyday American 
parents seeking what is best for their child.183 Some may have strong 
 
177. The Prince Court held that the parent’s free exercise rights under the 
First Amendment were not violated, stating that “he cannot claim 
freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself 
on religious grounds.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944). The Court supported this analogy to compulsory vaccination by 
saying, “The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to 
expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter 
to ill health or death.” Id. at 166–67. 
178. Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Schs., 739 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
179. See Salmon & Siegel, supra note 11, at 289 (building on the idea of 
analogizing conscientious objection from conscription with exemption 
from compulsory vaccination laws). 
180. See supra note 119. 
181. Willrich, supra note 14, at 279. 
182. Id.  
183. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
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religious or philosophical beliefs.184 Some may just have fears.185 There 
may be differences in opinion as to what is for the best; however, with 
the increasing frequency of individuals seeking exemption, legislatures 
have not repealed their religious exemption clauses in their mandatory 
vaccination statutes. This reflects the fact that the American constitu-
ency wants to keep the exemptions and preserve their civil liberties. 
One example is the practical outcome of Boone v. Boozman.186 
The initial legal outcome of Boozman was that Arkansas’s compulsory 
vaccination laws no longer contained religious or philosophical 
exemptions.187 But removing the exemptions proved so unpopular that 
the provision was rewritten.188 Today the law allows any parent to 
receive a religious or philosophical exemption.189 Additionally, the fact 
that almost all states have religious exemptions and almost half have 
philosophical exemptions means that eliminating exemptions 
altogether would be immensely unpopular.190 Thus, from a historical 
and political perspective, some form of religious exemption should be 
allowed. 
Additionally, the Prince dicta and courts that broadly hold that 
individuals should not have the right to practice their religion at the 
expense of exposing the community and children to communicable 
diseases must be put into context. 191 The communicable diseases, 
illnesses, and deaths that the Court envisioned in Jacobson and 
Prince were the terrifying images of smallpox and the mass deaths 
that occurred when the epidemic hit the United States in the early 
1900s.192 Although STIs are an important public health challenge, 
their consequences are not the same as smallpox and diseases that fall 
 
184. See Grady, supra note 1 (describing a mother’s discomfort with the 
HPV vaccine because of its implications on her and her family’s religious 
ideology and practices). 
185. See Leblanc, supra note 5 (describing a worried mother willing to go far 
to protect her child from what she views as the dangers of vaccination). 
186. 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002). 
187. See Note, supra note 159, at 1831. 
188. Ark. Code. Ann. § 6-18-702(d)(4)(A) (2007); see also M. Craig Smith, 
Note, A Bad Reaction: A Look at the Arkansas General Assembly’s 
Response to McCarthy v. Boozman and Boone v. Boozman, 58 Ark. L. 
Rev. 251, 257–58 (2005). 
189. Ark. Code. Ann. § 6-18-702(d)(4)(A); see also Smith, supra note 188, 
at 258. 
190. For states that have religious exemption clauses to their mandatory 
school vaccination statutes, see supra note 119. For states that have 
philosophical exemption clauses to their mandatory school vaccination 
laws, see supra note 121. 
191. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944). 
192. Id. 
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in the same category as smallpox. Thus, a right to religious exemption 
may not exist for diseases like smallpox, but such a right could exist 
for vaccinations against diseases like STIs. 
To support the idea that there should be a right to obtain exemp-
tion from certain types of vaccinations, the military draft cases, 
including Hamilton, Seeger, Welsh, and Gillette, can be used as an 
analogy. 193  The Court in Hamilton concluded that conscientious 
objector status was a privilege that came “from the acts of 
Congress.”194 These military conscientious objection cases support the 
idea that each state’s legislature should exercise discretion to provide 
religious exemptions to those who are genuine and sincere in their 
objections to legally mandated vaccinations. By including specific 
conditions for conscientious objections, which include (1) showing 
opposition to war, (2) because of religious beliefs, (3) that are sincere, 
this system creates a balance for preserving individual free exercise 
freedoms and serving the public interest. 195 Holders of nontheistic 
views and philosophical convictions were included in the definition of 
religion, as the Supreme Court allowed a broad scope for the 
definition of religion in these conscientious objection cases.196 Having a 
similar specific system with narrower conditions to provide 
exemptions for those religiously opposed to vaccinations would 
analogously create a balance of individual free exercise rights and the 
public health interest. Thus, the inference from these draft cases is 
that legislatures authorized to pass laws of compulsion, including 
state and local authorities in mandatory vaccination cases, have the 
discretion to allow religious exemptions, and the legislatures should 
allow exemptions in certain specific situations.  
Lastly, Yoder, which Smith specifically did not overrule and 
instead sought to distinguish, implies that the Free Exercise Clause is 
not dead.197 There are two alternative routes to Smith’s rational basis 
review: the hybrid-rights and Hialeah exceptions. Thus, current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence also does not seem to support eliminating 
religious exemptions altogether. From this analysis, the “limited 
exemption” approach has strong historical, political, and legal 
support; thus, this final approach should be the basis on which the 
legal framework is built.  
 
193. See Salmon & Siegel, supra note 11, at 289 (using conscientious 
objection from conscription as a model). 
194. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934).  
195. Salmon & Siegel, supra note 11, at 289. 
196. Id. at 293. 
197. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 205 (1972).  
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V. A Compromise: Implementing a Novel Legal Framework 
The above discussion explains how the “limited exemption” 
approach will yield the best balance between individual civil liberties 
and the states’ police powers. This approach involves upholding 
Jacobson and requiring vaccinations, but allowing religious 
exemptions from certain categories of compulsory vaccinations, which 
strikes a balance between maximizing individual civil liberties and 
allowing for a significant scope to state police powers. The analysis 
performed to reach this approach shows that Jacobson needs to be 
updated. One commentator has advocated this path and articulated a 
sound start for how to update Jacobson into a dual classification for 
necessity. 198 But there are some fundamental aspects to the dual 
system that need to be altered to create a working legal framework.  
This Note argues for a three-tiered analysis to generate a novel 
legal framework for keeping religious exemptions in a subset of 
circumstances. The three tiers of analysis include (1) starting with a 
law-medicine perspective to separate the vaccines into two categories, 
(2) applying a constitutional analysis by explaining why the hybrid-
rights exception should and can be used, and (3) advocating for 
certain policy considerations to fill the gaps. 
A. Law-Medicine Analysis: Tweaking the Dual System 
First, the dual path laid out by one commentator involves 
classifying vaccines into two categories, derived from the Jacobson 
necessity language.199 The two categories are medically necessary and 
practically necessary vaccines.200 “Medically necessary” vaccines are 
“the only known viable defenses against diseases taking hold in a 
community.”201 “Practically necessary” vaccines, on the other hand, 
are not the only possibility for addressing the disease, but the 
“alternatives are, in practice, not used by a significant number of 
people.”202 This categorization is too broad because there can always 
be other defenses and alternatives that are not widely used. This Note 
argues for incorporating a medical methodology along with the legal 
analysis to separate vaccines into these two original groups: medically 
and practically necessary vaccines. 
The commentator points out, citing the smallpox vaccine in 
Jacobson as an example of a medically necessary vaccine, that “there 
was no other less coercive means available to [stamp out] the 
 
198. Note, supra note 159, at 1834. 
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outbreak.”203 But as an example of other means, public health official 
Friedrich was able to temporarily rid the city of Cleveland of 
smallpox through isolation and rigorous and systematic disinfection of 
houses. 204 Thus, there were other means—whether they were less 
coercive or not is debatable. The commentator also contrasts smallpox 
with HPV, citing the HPV vaccine as an example of a practically 
necessary one because there are easier alternative methods to 
protecting oneself, such as “sexual knowledge, disease screening, safe 
sex, and abstinence.”205 While stating that the line between medically 
and practically necessary vaccines will not always be clear, the 
commentator starts the analysis by generally delineating two 
categories. 206  But to actually apply the analysis, a law-medicine 
perspective must be used.  
The rapid output of new medical information shows a strong link 
between HPV and various cancers and diseases. 207 Currently, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) statistics show 
that each year, about 12,000 women get cervical cancer in the United 
States, and almost all of these cancers are HPV associated. 208  
Interpreting the “almost all” language in the CDC’s statement, this 
means that HPV almost satisfies the condition of necessity because 
almost every person who has cervical cancer has HPV infection.209 
But just because those who have cervical cancer also have or have 
had HPV infection is not persuasive enough to satisfy the urgency 
that the Jacobson necessity standard implies: sufficiency is also 
important. HPV infection does not satisfy the sufficiency condition 
because not everyone who has HPV gets cervical cancer, and in fact a 
significant majority of women who are infected with HPV do not get 
cancer.210 Thus, the distinction between smallpox and HPV, and what 
fits the necessity standard of Jacobson, is not whether there are 
 
203. Id. 
204. Willrich, supra note 14, at 239. 
205. Note, supra note 159, at 1820. 
206. Id. 
207. See Div. of STD Prevention, supra note 173 (“High-risk types of 
HPV are found in ≥ 93% of cervical cancers worldwide . . . [and t]his 
body of epidemiologic and laboratory data is sufficiently strong that the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer and the National 
Institutes of Health have concluded that high-risk genital HPV types act 
as carcinogens in the development of cervical cancer.”). 
208. Sexually Transmitted Diseases, supra note 173. 
209. See Div. Of STD Prevention, supra note 173, at 6 (“[I]nfection with 
high-risk types appears to be ‘necessary’ for the development of cervical 
cancer”). 
210. Id. 
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alternative remedies for preventing the disease but rather the nature 
of the disease itself.  
For example, infection with the variola virus was necessary for the 
development of smallpox because all those with smallpox were 
infected with the variola virus. 211 Additionally, those infected by the 
variola virus would inevitably get smallpox.212 Therefore, infection by 
the variola virus was sufficient to get smallpox. Under this analysis of 
the nature of the disease alone, the danger surrounding smallpox 
infection and the necessity for the smallpox vaccine was much higher 
than for an HPV vaccine. The danger and necessity surrounding 
smallpox gave rise to Jacobson, and applying the Jacobson holding 
broadly to all successful vaccines would be inappropriate.  
Instead of deeming vaccinations to be medically necessary because 
there are no other alternatives, and practically necessary because 
there are alternatives, the approach should be to emulate the type of 
analysis followed in Boone: evaluate the nature, communicability, and 
consequences of the disease that a vaccine would target. 213  The 
necessity analysis regarding the nature of the disease shows that the 
underlying rationale of Jacobson, which was targeted at infections like 
smallpox, does not fit infections like HPV.214 Infections like HPV are 
communicable in noncasual settings and result in consequences less 
severe and immediate compared to infections like smallpox. Since 
infections like HPV do not pose the same danger as smallpox, the 
necessity for compulsory vaccination is not nearly as great as in 
Jacobson. 
Although the Boone court’s analysis was novel in that it targeted 
the nature, communicability, and consequence of the disease hepatitis 
B, the analysis faltered and ultimately failed because the law-medicine 
approach was not complete. Firstly, the Boone court came to the 
broad conclusion that, because high-risk groups would not likely “self-
identify and pursue the [HBV] vaccine,” immunizing would have a 
larger impact on public health and safety.215 This does not fit the 
standard that was set forth in Jacobson. Justice Harlan articulated in 
Jacobson that “[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount 
 
211. See Willrich, supra note 14, at 21–23 (describing indirectly the 
infectiousness and causation between the variola virus and smallpox). 
212. Id. at 23. 
213. See Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002) 
(addressing these aspects in regard to hepatitis B and providing a more 
in depth law-medicine analysis than other courts have).  
214. Although the Supreme Court did not specifically analyze the necessity 
and sufficiency issue in Jacobson, the broad necessity standard that 
Justice Harlan articulated in his majority opinion emulates the logic 
behind the necessity and sufficiency analysis undertaken in Part V.A.  
215. Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 954. 
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necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an 
epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.”216 The 
Boone court stated that the Jacobson decision was not limited to 
those diseases presenting only a “clear and present danger.”217 But 
Justice Harlan used the words “paramount necessity,” “self-defense,” 
“epidemic,” and “threatens,” which all indicate danger and urgency. 
This seems to support the “clear and present danger” idea used in 
Brown and Christine M., which were distinguished from each other 
but both held to this standard.218 
Secondly, the Boone court discussed communicability of the 
disease briefly, stating that “Hepatitis B is spread by bodily fluids” 
and has a robust survival rate on surfaces, but the court did not carry 
the medical analysis further.219 Spreading through bodily fluids means 
that hepatitis B can spread through contact with blood, semen, and 
vaginal fluids.220 Thus, infection spreads through sexual contact with 
a person infected by HBV or shared needles. “[The] Hepatitis B . . . 
virus[ ] cannot be spread by casual contact, such as holding hands, 
sharing eating utensils or drinking glasses, breast-feeding, kissing, 
hugging, coughing or sneezing.”221 The nature and communicability of 
hepatitis B in comparison with a disease like smallpox is 
distinguishable, and while the Boone court referred to the distinction, 
the court did not seem to embrace the full depth of the medical 
dissimilarity.222  
The court discussed the consequences of HBV, stating that the 
virus can lead to “sclerosis, scarring . . . of the liver, or liver cancer 
 
216. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). Justice Harlan 
used “necessity” twice more in his opinion in Jacobson, further 
highlighting the necessity standard that was set forth in this decision. 
See id. at 28, 30. 
217. Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 954. 
218. Compare Brown v. City Sch. Dist. of Corning, 429 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 
(Sup. Ct. 1980) (“[T]he Court must be satisfied . . . that there is no 
present circumstance which, in the opinion of the public health 
authorities, represents a clear and present danger of the particular 
communicable disease.”), with In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 618 
(Fam. Ct. 1992) (declining to order inoculation because there was no 
“urgency” due to an epidemic or outbreak). 
219.  Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 954. 
220. Hepatitis B, MedlinePlus, U.S. Nat’l Libr. Med., http://www.nlm.nih. 
gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000279.htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2012).  
221. Hepatitis: Prevention, N.Y. Times Health Guide, http://health. 
nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/hepatitis/prevention.html (updated 
Sep. 29, 2010). 
222. Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (“Even if such a distinction could be 
made [between smallpox and hepatitis B], the Court cannot say that 
Hepatitis B presents no such clear and present danger.”). 
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after chronic infection,”223 but the court did not analyze how this 
result leads to a similar situation of urgent necessity as a disease like 
smallpox. In a very general sense, HBV is fatal in about 1% of 
cases, 224  whereas “death may occur in up to 30% of [smallpox] 
cases.” 225 But HBV and smallpox each have variances from their 
general and most common forms. A type of HBV characterized as 
acute HBV is fatal in approximately 0.5% to 1% of cases, and fatality 
results in about 15% of those infected with what is called chronic 
HBV infection (long-term infection cases) after childhood.226 The most 
common form of smallpox variola major had an overall fatality rate of 
about 30%.227 Flat and hemorrhagic smallpox, two types of variola 
major, were usually fatal, while variola minor (“a less common 
presentation of smallpox”), had death rates of 1% or less.228 This level 
of insight into smallpox was not present in 1905 when Jacobson was 
decided.  
This deeper understanding shows that there is a gray area in 
distinguishing the danger of HBV and smallpox when analyzing only 
the consequences of viral infection. Thus, the factors that Boone 
initially started to analyze, which include the nature, communicability, 
and consequences of the disease, should be analyzed completely in 
deciding whether a vaccine should fall into the category of medically 
necessary or practically necessary.229 To be able to analogize and 
distinguish which vaccines should fall under medically necessary and 
which should fall under practically necessary, the viral infection 
should, like smallpox, be easily communicable and have severe 
consequences.230 Furthermore, the target of the vaccine should be 
both necessary to develop into its targeted preventable disease and 
sufficient to do so in accordance with Jacobson’s necessity 
 
223. Id. 
224. MedlinePlus, supra note 220. 
225. Emergency Preparedness and Response: Questions and Answers About 
Smallpox Disease, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/faq/smallpox_disease.asp (last 
updated Mar. 13, 2009).  
226. See Hepatitis B Information for Health Professionals: Hepatitis B FAQs for 
Health Professionals, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/hbv/hbvfaq.htm (updated Jan. 31, 2012). 
227  Emergency Preparedness and Response: Smallpox Fact Sheet, Ctrs. 
for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/ 
agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp (last updated Dec. 30, 2004). 
228. Id. 
229. See Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002). 
230. See Gostin, supra note 169, at 483 (arguing that a reasonably high 
standard of public harm should be required before public health 
intervention). 
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standard.231 This logical construction is what the medical community 
relies on, and the legal community should do the same in evaluating 
medical decisions.232 
An influential public health scholar, Lawrence Gostin, has argued 
that making inoculations like the HPV vaccine mandatory contributes 
to the concerns of parents about the safety of school-based 
vaccinations and may have negative consequences, like “heighten[ed] 
parental and public apprehensions.”233 Additionally, Gostin has stated 
that the major underlying basis for public health law is to prevent 
harm to the public and thus the threshold for public health 
intervention should be reasonably high.234 Thus, Gostin and his camp 
would likely approve of having two categories of mandatory 
vaccinations—medically necessary vaccines and practically necessary 
vaccines—because separating the two types of vaccines using the 
Jacobson necessity standard more adequately aligns with the 
underlying public health rationale, and having fewer vaccinations on 
the mandatory list may decrease that public anxiety.235  
B. Constitutional Analysis: Incorporating the Hybrid-Rights Exception 
into the Dual System 
Once a law-medicine analysis is employed and the vaccines 
mandated are categorized as medically necessary or practically 
necessary, the next step is to evaluate the two categorizations of 
vaccines. If the vaccination mandate did not provide for exemptions, 
the claim for religious exemption would be based on the Free Exercise 
Clause.236 The two major considerations for successfully bringing a 
 
231. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) (containing 
necessity language by Justice Harlan).  
232. See Div. of STD Prevention, supra note 173, at 6 (using necessity 
and sufficiency language in medical analysis). 
233. Lawrence O. Gostin & Catherine D. DeAngelis, Editorial, Mandatory 
HPV Vaccination: Public Health vs Private Wealth, 297 JAMA 1921, 
1922 (2007). 
234. See Gostin, supra note 169, at 483 (“[T]he seriousness and probability of 
[harm to the public] should be the primary parameter for decision-
making. The absence of any intention to serve the interests of the 
individual suggests that the threshold for public health action should be 
a reasonably high probability of serious harm to the public.”). 
235. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28 (“We say necessities of the case, because it 
might be that an acknowledged power of a local community to protect 
itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all, might be 
exercised in particular circumstances . . . in such an arbitrary, 
unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably 
required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the 
courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.”). 
236. See U.S. Const. amend. I. 
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claim would be (1) scrutiny level and (2) the type of successful claim 
that can be brought.  
1. Scrutiny Level: How to Get Around Smith  
A successful claim for religious exemption from mandatory school 
vaccination laws would have to be a hybrid-rights claim because the 
compulsory school vaccination laws are neutral laws of general 
applicability under Smith.237 If the claim were evaluated under Smith, 
the scrutiny level would be rational basis review, and the claim would 
not likely survive because most courts have stated that vaccination 
laws satisfy rational basis. Thus, the claim needs to be one of the 
other alternative routes so as to implicate a higher level of scrutiny. 
Those alternative routes are claims falling under Hialeah and the 
hybrid-rights exception. But vaccination laws are not discriminatory 
laws of the sort invalidated in Hialeah.238 Thus, the only alternative is 
the hybrid-rights claim.  
In the case of compulsory vaccination, the court should no longer 
apply the Smith rational basis test in the face of a hybrid-rights claim 
but rather should apply a higher standard—strict scrutiny. 239 While a 
law of general and neutral applicability is presumptively valid, when a 
hybrid-rights case is sufficiently similar to Yoder, the validity of the 
general and neutrally applicable law is questioned. 240  Smith also 
explains that the Sherbert test was created in a context that “lent 
itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the 
relevant conduct.”241 Like the unemployment compensation programs 
in Sherbert, this vaccination system creates a mechanism for 
individualized exemptions.242 Thus, analogous to Sherbert, whether 
the State can infringe upon an individual’s free exercise right should 
be evaluated under a compelling governmental interest test—the 
strict scrutiny standard. Assuming that a successful hybrid-rights 
 
237. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (discussing laws that 
are neutral and of general applicability). 
238. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 534–35 (1993) (holding that the Hialeah ordinance was 
unconstitutional because the statute discriminated against those who 
practice Santeria). 
239. See Hope Lu, Comment, Addressing the Hybrid Rights Exception: How 
the Colorable-Plus Approach Can Revive the Free Exercise Clause, 63 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 257, 279–80 (2012) (using the language of Smith 
to explain why strict scrutiny is logically the appropriate level of review 
for hybrid-rights claims). 
240. Id. at 280. 
241. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990). 
242. See supra Part V.A (discussing medically necessary and practically 
necessary vaccines). 
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claim triggers strict scrutiny, the next inquiry would be how to bring 
a successful hybrid-rights case. 
2. Successfully Bringing a Hybrid-Rights Claim 
Since both medically and practically necessary vaccinations would 
be mandated, the next threshold inquiry would be whether the 
hybrid-rights exception is a viable option. Although there has been 
significant controversy in the lower courts over what the Supreme 
Court truly meant by “hybrid” cases, there are three major 
approaches to the hybrid-rights exception that have been recognized: 
(1) the “refusal-to-recognize” approach, (2) the “independently viable” 
theory, and (3) the “colorable-claim” approach.243  
After evaluating each approach for its likelihood of success as the 
basis of a hybrid-rights claim, the two approaches that may succeed 
in a claim for religious exemption from mandatory school vaccination 
laws are the independently viable claim and the colorable-claim 
approaches. For parents seeking to bring a hybrid-rights claim, which 
would likely be a free exercise claim coupled with the parents’ 
fundamental right to raise their child, bringing such a claim in a court 
that recognizes the colorable-claim approach would likely be the most 
successful.  
a. The Refusal-To-Recognize Approach 
Some courts have refused to recognize the hybrid-rights claim, 
unless the Supreme Court gives express confirmation of the 
exception’s validity. 244  This is now described as the “refusal-to-
recognize” approach.245 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit initially used this refusal-to-recognize approach in 
 
243. See Lu, supra note 239, at 265–67; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1262 (3d ed. 2006) 
(‘‘Lower courts have done relatively little to clarify when a claim should 
be regarded as ‘hybrid’ under Smith.’’). There are some minor 
approaches that scholars have proposed as alternatives or solutions of 
the “best approach” for addressing the hybrid-rights exception. See 
Benjamin I. Siminou, Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Rights: An Analysis 
of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s Approach to the Hybrid-Rights 
Exception in Douglas County v. Anaya, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 311, 324 
(2006) (describing another potential hybrid rights approach called the 
genuine implication theory); Lu, supra note 239, at 269–72 (discussing 
additional approaches that characterize some circuits’ decisions, 
including the “open-recognition” approach). These approaches could also 
be successful in bringing a hybrid-rights claim in the compulsory school 
vaccination law context.  
244. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(rejecting the application of strict scrutiny, or in fact anything higher 
than Smith’s rational basis review, to a hybrid-rights case); Leebaert v. 
Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) (same). 
245. Siminou, supra note 243, at 318. 
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Kissinger v. Board of Trustees,246 where the court stated that the 
hybrid-rights exception was “completely illogical” because the level of 
scrutiny should not depend upon the number of constitutional rights 
claimed.247 The court held that a public university’s policy regarding 
the school’s veterinary-medicine curriculum, which had a required 
course involving operations on live animals, did not need to meet any 
standard stricter than the standard in Smith.248 Therefore, the court 
applied rational basis review. 249  The Second Circuit 250  and the 
Missouri Supreme Court251 have also taken this view.252  
In a jurisdiction that follows the “refusal-to-recognize” approach, 
a hybrid-rights claim seeking religious exemption from compulsory 
school vaccination laws would fail because the court would not 
recognize the hybrid-rights claim. 
b. The Independently Viable Claim Theory 
The independently viable claim approach to the hybrid-rights 
exception requires the free exercise right be conjoined with an 
accompanying claim that is independently viable in order for strict 
scrutiny to be triggered.253 The courts that have been thought to take 
this approach are the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit, although whether the 
First Circuit followed the independent viability claim is debated.254 In 
EEOC v. Catholic University of America,255 the D.C. Circuit held 
 
246. Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 177. 
247. Id. at 180. 
248. Id.  
249. Id. 
250. See Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 143–44 (agreeing with Kissinger that scrutiny 
level should not be dictated by the number of constitutional claims 
available to the plaintiff). 
251. See, e.g., Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537, 547–48 (Mo. 2002) (en 
banc) (agreeing with Kissinger and that case’s analysis). 
252. See Lu, supra note 239, at 265–66, 273–74 (2012) (providing a more 
detailed explanation and review of the “refusal-to-recognize” approach).  
253. See John L. Tuttle, Note, Adding Color: An Argument for the Colorable 
Showing Approach to Hybrid Rights Claims Under Employment Division 
v. Smith, 3 Ave Maria L. Rev. 741, 754 (2005) (discussing the 
approach taken by the First and D.C. Circuits). 
254. See Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and Hybrid Religious 
Exemptions, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1494, 1501 (2010) (“[T]he First Circuit 
may now be best understood to apply a different approach . . . .”); see 
also Lu, supra note 239, at 267, 269–70 (fleshing out the “independently 
viable” approach and discussing why the First Circuit’s approach does 
not fall under this view any more). 
255. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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that a religious ministerial exception survived Smith, but if that was 
an incorrect conclusion, the holding was still valid because the 
plaintiff could use the hybrid-rights exception by joining her Free 
Exercise Clause claim with her independently viable Establishment 
Clause claim.256 
The independently viable claim may be successful if brought in a 
court that recognizes this approach; however, this theory may not be 
the most suitable approach because it is fundamentally and logically 
flawed. If each claim can be brought independently, then the existence 
of a hybrid-rights exception is not needed.257 The plaintiff could just 
bring each claim forward on its own. Additionally, it might be 
difficult for a parent to argue an independently viable claim.  
c. The Colorable-Claim Standard 
The last major approach is the colorable-claim standard.258 In 
order to qualify for a hybrid-rights exception, the colorable-claim 
standard requires that a plaintiff with a free exercise claim join that 
claim with a “colorable claim” that an accompanying constitutional 
right has also been violated—“colorable” meaning that there is a 
“likelihood . . . of success on the merits.”259 
The colorable-claim approach was formulated from a case decided 
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Swanson 
v. Guthrie Independent School District No. 1-L.260 The Tenth Circuit 
concluded that even though Smith was not particularly instructive 
about the application of the hybrid-rights exception, for such a 
hybrid-rights claim to be brought there had to be “at least [a] 
require[d] colorable showing of infringement of recognized and specific 
constitutional rights, rather than the mere invocation of a general 
right.” 261 In other words, a colorable claim did not require a clear and 
blatant violation of an accompanying constitutional right, but it did 
require more than a general allegation. 262 But this court did not 
 
256. Id. at 466–68.  
257. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (stating that because 
the independent free exercise claim succeeded, the Court did not have 
reason to analyze the equal protection claim as well). 
258. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 465 
(N.Y. 2006) (rejecting the hybrid rights approach because the claim of 
free speech in addition to the free exercise challenge was 
“insubstantial”). 
259. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Thomas v. 
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n., 165 F.3d 692, 703, 707 (9th Cir. 
1999), vacated, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). 
260. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-L, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998). 
261. Id. at 700. 
262. Id. 
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actually apply the hybrid-rights exception because the plaintiffs did 
not meet the showing of a colorable claim.263 The colorable-claim 
approach was then adopted by the Ninth Circuit,264 which in a line of 
cases affirmed the standard265 and concluded that a colorable claim of 
an accompanying constitutional violation served to hybridize the 
companion claim with the plaintiffs’ free exercise action.266  
There are criticisms of the logic of the colorable-claim approach.267 
One criticism is that the approach of adding two failing claims to 
create a winning claim is illogical.268 But this perspective arises when 
the free exercise claim and the additional constitutional claim are 
viewed as completely separate claims. This criticism can be resolved 
by shifting the viewpoint of the “colorable-claim” approach to the 
“colorable-plus” approach.269 The colorable-plus approach adopts the 
rationale of the First Circuit’s 2008 decision in Parker v. Hurley, 
which stated that each part of a hybrid-rights claim should be 
reviewed interdependently rather than separately.270 For example, a 
parent’s claim regarding religious exemptions from compulsory school 
vaccination laws would likely include a free exercise claim and a claim 
concerning the parent’s fundamental right to raise her child. These 
two claims, whether a parent’s right to exercise her religion freely and 
raise her child under those religious beliefs has been violated, are “sets 
of interests [that] inform one [an]other” and are interrelated. 271  
 
263. See id. (“Based on the foregoing, we hold that Defendants were not 
required to show a compelling state interest in this case, despite 
Plaintiffs’ attempt to invoke the hybrid-rights doctrine.”).  
264. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 704–05 (applying the colorable-claim test after 
an in-depth analysis of the other available approaches and hybridizing 
the case). Thomas was vacated en banc due to lack of ripeness. 220 F.3d 
1134, 1137. 
265. See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the 
standard set out in Thomas).  
266. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004) (also 
affirming the Thomas standard and using the colorable-claim test 
because it is a middle ground solution). 
267. See Note, supra note 254, at 1505 (criticizing the colorable-claim 
approach); see also Lu, supra note 239, at 276–77 (explaining criticisms 
of the colorable-claim approach). 
268. Note, supra note 254, at 1505. 
269. See Lu, supra note 239, at 278–79 (introducing the idea of the 
colorable-plus approach).  
270. Id.; see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 98 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
Court did not analyze separately the due process and free exercise 
interests of the parent-plaintiffs, but rather considered the two claims 
interdependently . . . .”). 
271. Parker, 514 F.3d at 98. 
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Because these interests inform one another and are so intertwined, it 
is logical and desirable to view these claims together to determine 
whether cumulatively the claims are strong enough to serve as the 
basis of a hybrid-rights claim.272 Thus, the colorable-plus approach 
views the free exercise claim and the additional colorable 
constitutional claim in totality, rather than separately, to reach the 
question of whether a hybrid rights claim is available. 
The colorable-plus standard is fundamentally more desirable than 
any other approach. This approach is stronger than the refusal-to-
recognize approach because the latter ignores the fact that the 
Supreme Court developed the hybrid-rights idea in Smith. 273 The 
colorable-plus approach is also stronger than the independently viable 
claim approach because the former standard does not create the same 
logical fallacy that the independently viable claim does and resolves 
the criticism against the colorable-claim approach. Thus, assuming 
that a compulsory vaccination case can be viewed as a hybrid-rights 
case through the colorable-plus approach, the next inquiry is whether 
strict scrutiny is satisfied. 
3. Strict Scrutiny: Medically Necessary, Not Practically Necessary 
Even though strict scrutiny is implicated, the strict scrutiny 
standard is not always fatal to the government’s case, as was depicted 
in Prince. Even under a standard comparable to strict scrutiny, the 
Supreme Court in Prince upheld child labor regulations against a 
woman who allowed her children to sell religious magazines on the 
street.274 Similarly, separating mandatory vaccinations into medically 
necessary and practically necessary shows that, in the face of a 
hybrid-rights claim, medically necessary vaccinations would meet 
strict scrutiny analysis and practically necessary vaccinations would 
not. 
Medically necessary vaccinations satisfy strict scrutiny because 
they meet the necessary and sufficiency standards. If a vaccine is both 
necessary and sufficient, satisfying that high standard of necessity 
should meet the Jacobson public necessity standard. As many courts 
have found, and as the Court has expressed itself, if the law satisfies 
the Jacobson standard of necessity, then it is within the government’s 
police powers to enforce that law. In other words, satisfying Jacobson 
satisfies strict scrutiny. Because medically necessary vaccinations meet 
the Jacobson necessity standard, medically necessary vaccinations 
withstand strict scrutiny. 
 
272. See generally Lu, supra note 239, at 275–82 (for a deeper discussion of 
the arguments and rationale for the colorable-plus approach). 
273. For Justice Scalia’s language about the hybrid rights theory, see Emp’t 
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
274. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 162 (1944). 
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On the other hand, practically necessary vaccinations do not meet 
the necessary and sufficiency standards and thus do not satisfy the 
Jacobson necessity standard. Thus, practically necessary vaccinations 
would not satisfy strict scrutiny. Therefore, when plaintiffs that bring 
hybrid-rights claims, courts should grant religious exemptions from 
practically necessary vaccinations but not medically necessary ones. 
Conclusion: Applying the Framework and Relevant 
Policy Considerations 
With the recent developments in our understanding of HPV and 
its vaccine,275 legislation trying to mandate HPV vaccination has been 
introduced in the majority of states—forty-one.276 Virginia277 and the 
District of Columbia278 have enacted HPV vaccine mandates. Texas 
did as well but later revoked it. 279 Both Virginia and the District of 
Columbia offer lenient exemptions at the discretion of parents. 
Virginia allows religious exemptions from mandatory vaccines unless a 
public health emergency or epidemic is declared.280 The District of 
Columbia has exemptions for any reason with a letter from a parent 
or guardian.281 Thus, legislatures recognize that vaccinations against 
STI are a significant medical accomplishment. But significance does 
not equal necessity. This Note argues that vaccines targeting STIs, 
like HPV vaccines, do not fall into the category of medically necessary 
vaccinations because of an assessment of the nature, communicability, 
and consequences of the infection. Therefore, states should use several 
policy tools to fill the gaps. 
Public health agencies should use current marketing and social 
networking tools to educate the public. For example, labeling HPV 
vaccine as an anticancer vaccine creates a misconception. HPV 
vaccine does significantly decrease the likelihood of a woman getting 
 
275. See NCSL, supra note 2 (discussing the effects of HPV and the strains 
that the vaccine effectively treats).  
276. See id. 
277. Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-46 (West 2011). 
278. D.C. Code § 7-1651.04 (2011). 
279. Lawrence O. Gostin, Commentary, Mandatory HPV Vaccination and 
Political Debate, 306 JAMA 1699, 1699 (2011) (detailing 2011 
presidential candidate Michele Bachmann’s challenge against adversary 
Rick Perry’s executive order mandating the HPV vaccine for girls, 
which the Texas legislature later revoked because of backlash from 
constituents).  
280. See Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-46 (describing Virginia’s statute on religious 
exemptions from mandatory vaccinations). 
281. See D.C. Code § 7-1651.04 (describing Washington D.C.’s statute on 
religious exemptions from mandatory vaccinations). 
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cervical cancer—but only cervical cancer that is closely associated 
with certain types of high-risk HPVs.282 The tight association between 
HPV and cervical cancer should push states to work with drug 
companies to market this vaccine as an antiviral vaccine that 
prevents almost all HPV-associated cervical cancers. 283  But HPV 
vaccine is a vaccine for the virus, not for the cancer. Getting the HPV 
vaccine does prevent the spread of HPV.284 However, preventing the 
spread of HPV does not necessarily mean that someone will not then 
get cervical cancer.285 This is the root of the necessary and sufficient 
discussion. Agencies should use updated social networking tools to 
share this information so today’s youth understand that, while 
receiving the HPV vaccine does significantly reduce the risk of 
cervical cancer, the HPV vaccine does not target other STIs and does 
not prevent all cancers. This discrepancy between association and 
causation is precisely why HPV vaccine is a practically necessary 
vaccination, not medically necessary vaccination. 
The Internet has also drastically affected the vaccine dialogue.286 
Antivaccinationists use the Internet to spread information and garner 
support for their cause.287 The government and public health commu-
nity should do the same and use social media to educate the public 
about STIs and how to prevent the spread of infection. Creating 
Facebook groups that offer accurate, concise, and understandable 
information about what HPV is and what the vaccine does can 
increase the visibility of the positive public health implications. Using 
Twitter to document public health statistics regarding the HPV 
growth rate would be eye-opening (and alarming) for young adults. 
The vaccine narrative is an age-old issue, but the emergence of 
novel biomedical technology that enhances our understanding of 
diseases has added another layer of complexity to the legal analysis. 
STI vaccines raise the need for different First Amendment analysis 
because the diseases these vaccines target present a less compelling 
governmental interest than the vaccines of Jacobson’s time, such as 
smallpox. Courts currently assume that Jacobson stands for the 
proposition that compulsory vaccination laws satisfy the compelling 
governmental interest and this standard applies to all types of 
vaccines. But the majority of decisions have overlooked the fact that 
 
282. See Div. of STD Prevention, supra note 173, at 6 (showing tight 
association between high risk HPV types and cancers). 
283. See Sexually Transmitted Diseases, supra note 173.  
284. See Div. of STD Prevention, supra note 173, at 6 (discussing 
necessity and sufficiency between HPV and cervical cancer). 
285. Id. 
286. Willrich, supra note 14, at 343.  
287. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013 
Giving Families Their Best Shot 
913 
new biomedical vaccines may target certain types of illnesses that do 
not satisfy the compelling governmental interest test. Thus, the 
government is increasing its regulatory scope in areas that are in 
tension with First Amendment civil liberties—in this case, the right 
to exercise one’s religion.  
This Note argues that the public health analysis is currently ill 
defined and needs to be updated. Once updated, a law-medicine 
perspective and the constitutional hybrid-rights exception can salvage 
a free exercise claim against compulsory vaccination laws. The 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the disarray of lower court decisions, 
and the imprecise state statutory frameworks have led to overly broad 
regulatory power. After analyzing the four potential avenues for the 
scope of an exemption allowance, this Note argues that individual 
civil liberties must be balanced with state police powers. After 
conducting historical, policy, and legal analyses, these evaluations 
show that a right to exemption from compulsory vaccination laws 
should exist, even if it is not necessarily a constitutional right and 
even if such a right can only exist in a limited situation.  
Building upon the limited-exemption framework, this Note 
advocates a three-tiered free exercise analysis that can be 
extrapolated to other biomedical advances in vaccinations that have 
not yet surfaced: (1) using a law-medicine analysis to categorize 
vaccinations into medically necessary vaccines and practically 
necessary vaccines; (2) using a constitutional analysis by applying 
strict scrutiny under the hybrid rights exception, with only medically 
necessary vaccines satisfying that standard and thus allowing 
exemptions for only practically necessary vaccines; and (3) using 
policy to fill the gaps for practically necessary vaccines, which can 
include effective marketing decisions and public health tools. Thus, 
the law-medicine perspective and the hybrid-rights exception 
effectively salvage a limited free exercise right in the face of 
compulsory vaccination laws. 
Hope Lu †  
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Appendix 
Table 1. The Status of Each State’s Mandatory Vaccination Laws288 
State 
 





































AL Ala. Code § 16-30-1 • • •   • 
§ 16-30-3 
 
AK Alaska Admin. Code § 06.055 • • • •  • 
§ 06.055 
 
AZ Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-872 • • • • •  
§ 15-873 • 
AR Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-702 • • •   • 
§ 6-18 -702 
 
CA Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120325 • • •  • • 
§ 120365 • 
CO Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-4-902 • • •  • • 
§ 25-4-903 
 
CT Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-204a • • •  • • 
§ 10-204a 
 
DE Del. Code Ann. tit. 14 § 131 • • • 
 
• • § 14-131 
 
DC D.C. Code Ann. § 38-501* • • • • • • § 38-506 
 
FL Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1003.22* • • • 
 
• • § 1003.22* 
 
GA Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-771 • • • • • • § 20-2-771 
 
HI Haw. Rev. Stat. § 302A-1154 • • • 
 
• • § 302A-1156 
 




§ 39-4802 • 
IL 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/27-8.1* • • •  •  
§ 5/27-8.1* 
 
IN Ind. Code Ann. § 21-40-5 • • •  •  
§ 21-40-5-6* * 
IA Iowa Code Ann. § 139A.8* • • •    
§ 139A.8* 
 
KS Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-5209 • • •   • 
§ 72-5209 
 
KY Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 214.034 • • •  • • 
§ 214.036 
 
LA La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:170(A) • • •   • 
§ 17:170(E) • 
ME Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 20-A § 6355 • • • 
  
• 20-A § 6355 • 
MD Md. Code Ann. Educ. § 7-403 • • • 
 
• • § 7-403 
 
MA Mass. Gen Laws ch. 76, § 15 • • • 
 
• • ch. 76, § 15 
 
 
288. Table adapted from James G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, School 
Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 
Ky. L.J. 831, 869 (2002). Updates on statutes and which exemptions are 
offered adapted from States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions 
from School Immunization Requirements, Nat’l Conference of State 
Legislatures (Dec. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabId= 
14376. Asterisk indicates an update from Hodge & Gostin. Vaccine 
abbreviations are as follows: DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus), 
MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella), Polio (poliomyelitis) Hip 
(Haemophilus influenzae type B), Hep B (hepatitis B), Var (varicella). 
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MI Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.9208 • • •  • • 
§ 333.9215 • 
MN Minn. Stat. Ann. § 121A-15 • • •  •  
§ 121A.15 • 
MS Miss. Code Ann. § 41-23-37 • • •   • 
None 
 






MT Mont. Code Ann. § 20-5-403 • • • 
   
§ 20-5-405 
 
NE Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 79-217 • • • 
   
§ 79-221 • 
NV Nev. Rev. Stat. § 392.435 • • • 
   
§ 392.437 
 






NJ N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:1A-9 • • • 
   
§ 26:1A-9 
 
NM N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-5-1* • • •    § 24-5-3*  
NY N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164 • • •  •  
§ 2164 
 
NC N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-155 • • •  •  
§ 130A-157 
 
ND N.D. Cent. Code § 23-07-17.1 • • •    
§ 23-07-17.1 • 
OH Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.671 • • •  •  § 3313.671 • 
OK Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 1210.191 • •   • • § 1210.192 • 
OR Or. Rev. Stat. § 433.267 • • • • • • § 433.267 
 
PA 28 Pa. Code § 23.81* • • • 
 
• • § 23.84 •* 
RI R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-38-2 • • • • • • § 16-38-2 
 
SC S.C. Code Ann. § 44-29-180 • • • 
 
• • § 44-29-180 
 
SD S.D. Codified Laws § 13-28-7.1 • • • 
  
• § 13-28-7.1 
 
TN Tenn. Code Ann. §49-6-5001 • • • 
  
• § 49-6-5001 
 
TX Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 38.001* • • • • • • § 38.001(c)(1)(B)* •* 
UT Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11-301* • • •  • • § 53A-11-302 •* 
VT Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1121 • • •    § 1122 • 
VA Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-271.2 • • •   • § 32.1-46(D)(1)*  
WA Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28A.210.080 • • •  •  § 28A.210.090* • 
WV W. Va. Code § 16-3-4 • • •    
None 
 
WY Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-309 • • • 







   
